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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-FII

SUBJECT:

Scheduling of National Level Intelligence Estimates and

Memorandums (U)

THRU:

Lieutenant General Samuel V-Wilson

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

Washington, De 20301

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COMMAND WITH POINT

TO:

Mr. E. H. Knoche Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, DC 20505

1. (S) Several national level intelligence products have proven to be very helpful in preparing the Army's leaders in presenting testimony before congressional committees. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s," is an excellent example. However, the current scheduling of some national level intelligence estimates and memorandums results in their not being completed in time to be used for these important hearings. Even NIE 11-3/8-76, approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) on 21 Dec 76, would have been more useful if it had been available in October during the drafting of various posture statements in the Department of Defense.

(S) It is recommended that the NFIB consider scheduling selected national level intelligence products for completion prior to beginning preparations of future testimony before Congress and final DOD budget decisions. While I realize that NIE's normally are not repeated on a regular basis, the following NIE's would be more useful if they were updated annually with completion dates as near to October as possible: NIE 11-3/8; NIE 11-4, "Soviet Strategic Objectives"; NIE 11-14, "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO"; NIE 35/36-1, "Middle East Military Balance 1976-1981"; and NIE 13, "PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces."


(U) Additionally, rescheduling the publication of selected NIE's should reduce the chances of intelligence testimony before Congress containing conflicting intelligence judgments.

> HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACofs for Intelligence

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ARMY review(s) completed.

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